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ASSISTED REPRODUCTION IN JEWISH LAW
Daniel B. Sinclair*

I.

ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION USING THE HUSBAND'S SPERM

("AIH"): JEWISH

AND CATHOLIC POSITIONS

This Section is devoted to a survey of Jewish law, or halakhah, in
relation to AIH, and a comparative discussion of Jewish and Catholic approaches to reproductive technology in general. AIH accounts for a small proportion of artificial insemination cases, and is
recommended in situations where the husband suffers from anatomical defects of his sexual organ or from severe psychological
impotence. It is also used, although rarely, where the husband has
a low sperm count. Occasionally, AIH may be recommended if the
husband is scheduled to undergo medical treatment that will
render him infertile or is likely do so.
AIH is permitted by a majority of halakhists.' The minority opposition argues that AIH breaches the halakhic prohibition on seed
destruction.2 According to the minority view, any sexual act in
which the husband does not ejaculate directly into his wife's reproductive tract is considered seed destruction, and must be avoided.'
* Professor of Jewish and Comparative Biomedical Law, Tel Aviv College of
Management Academic Studies, Law School. LL.B. (Hons.); LL.M.; LL.D. Ordained Rabbi and formerly Rabbi of the Edinburgh Hebrew Congregation and Dean
of Jews College (London).
1. See

AVRAHAM STEINBERG, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JEWISH MEDICAL ETHICS

54 (1988).
2. TALMUD

BAVLI YEVAMOT
ARUKH, EVEN HAEZER 23:2.

34b;

TALMUD

BAVLi NIDDAH

13a;

151-

SHULHAN

3. RESPONSA DIVREI MALKIEL 4 nos. 107-08; RESPONSA YASKIL AVDI 5, EVEN
HAEZER no. 10; RESPONSA Ziz ELIEZER 9 no. 51. These authorities prohibit AIH
even if it is the husband's intention to use the seed to establish a family. There is a
strong mystical input into the prohibitionist school, which is especially pronounced in
the view taken by the noted kabbalist, R. Ovadyah Hadaya. His approach to AIH is
influenced by the mystical belief that any semen which does not travel directly into
the female reproductive tract gives rise to demons of the night which remain in existence to plague the semen-emitter and his children right up until the moment of
death. RESPONSA YASKIL AVDI 5. Similar reasons underlie his opposition to the use
of AIH as a means of overcoming infertility resulting from early ovulation. Under
Jewish law, sexual relations are prohibited during the menstrual period so that if a
woman ovulates early in her menstrual cycle, when the halakhah prohibits sexual relations, she will be unable to conceive. See STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 300. To overcome this difficulty, a number of authorities suggest the use of AIH during that part
of the menstrual period in which regular intercourse is forbidden under rabbinic law
only. See id. at 153. R. Hadaya maintains that in such a case, "the child would suffer
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In accordance with this definition, the collection of semen for the
purpose of artificial insemination runs afoul of the prohibition on
seed destruction. Another argument used by these authorities
against AIH is the concern that the husband's sperm might be replaced, either inadvertently or by design, with that of a stranger,
with the result that the legal status of the child will be seriously
compromised. 4 It is important to emphasize that there is no specific mention amongst the prohibitionists of any opposition to AIH
on the grounds that it offends against the natural order of things.
Those who permit AIH do not find it difficult to overcome these
objections. Regarding the prohibition of seed destruction, the permissive scholars maintain that if the goal of the procedure is to
bring a child into the world, it is halakhically irrelevant that in the
course of achieving that goal there is a break between the ejaculation of the semen and its entry into the female reproductive organ.
Indeed, some semen always goes to waste, even in the course of
"natural" sexual relations. Regarding the concern of sperm replacement, it is well established, on the basis of general halakhic
principles, that the mere fear of such a scenario is not sufficient to
prohibit an otherwise halakhically permitted procedure, especially
when the object of the procedure is as worthy as the establishment
of a family.5 In any case, it is possible to take measures to ensure
that mix-ups are minimized. To this end, there are now trained
supervisors available in a number of clinics used by observant Jews,
who have the responsibility of ensuring that no foreign semen enters the procedure from the point of collection until insemination.6
from a great burden of mystical impurity, which is not easily removable." He is,
therefore, opposed to using AIH to resolve the problem of early ovulation. See
RESPONSA YASKIL AVDI 5, EVEN HAEZER no. 10. See generally Daniel J. Lasker,
Kabbalah,Halakhah and Modern Medicine, 8 MOD. JUDAISM 1, 1-14 (1988) (discussing the kabbalah-based prohibition on seed destruction in the context of halakhic
decisions on assisted reproduction). Of course, there is a long-standing relationship
between halakhah and kabbalah in Jewish law, but it is also a feature of halakhic
reasoning that the literary pedigree of a particular source is taken into account when
dealing with a practical issue, and the outcome should be shaped by the normative
ranking of the sources. See Bernard Jackson et al., Halakhah and Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JEWISH STUDIES (ch. 26 forthcoming) (Martin Goodman et al.
eds., 2002).
4. See supra Part II for a discussion on the legal ramifications of donor insemination in the context of adultery and mamzerut.
5. SHE'ELAT YA'AVEZ no. 43; RESPONSA MAHARSHAM 3 no. 268; RESPONSA
ZEKAN AHARON 2 no. 97; RESPONSA PRI HASADEH 3 no. 53; RESPONSA SERIDEI ESH
3 no. 5; RESPONSA MINHAT YITZHAK 1 no. 50; RESPONSA YABIA OMER 2, EVEN
HAEZER no. 1; RESPONSA IGGROT MOSHE, EVEN HAEZER 1 no. 71, 2 nos. 11, 18, 4
no. 32.
6. See Kosher Conception, JEWISH WK., July 11, 1997, at 10.
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On the assumption that AIH is permitted, especially in relation
to a couple for whom it is the only method for having children, the
most halakhically acceptable method for collecting the semen
would need to be worked out in consultation with a halakhic authority.7 Halakhic consultation would also be required when there
is a possibility that in order to achieve conception, the insemination
must take place during the wife's menstrual period, during which
intercourse between her and her husband would be forbidden
under Jewish law.'
A question that arises in relation to AIH is whether it constitutes
fulfillment of the biblical commandment to "be fruitful and multiply." 9 Some authorities maintain that because sexual intercourse is
a vital ingredient in the performance of this commandment (mitzvah), having a child through AIH does not constitute fulfillment of
the obligation.' 0 The competing view is that the essence of the obligation lies in the production of live progeny, and the process is
irrelevant. According to this view, the biblical commandment to
procreate is, indeed, fulfilled by a husband who inseminates his
wife in an artificial manner. 1 A compromise position adopted by
R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach suggests that although AIH does not
constitute performance of the full-blown biblical commandment to
be fruitful and multiply, it does qualify for the fulfillment of the
rabbinic obligations to populate the earth and not to leave it desolate. 2 By downgrading the commandment to the rabbinic level, R.
Auerbach ensures that AIH is still endowed with religious significance, even though it is not invested with the full normative force
of a biblical precept.
Thus, according to the majority of halakhists, not only is AIH
permitted, but also it constitutes the fulfillment of a mitzvah. Undoubtedly, this permissive approach also reflects the social conse7. RESPONSA IGGROT MOSHE, EVEN HAEZER 1 no. 70. In this context, it is noteworthy that R. Aaron Walkin forbids the extraction of semen for any other purpose
but the insemination of a wife. RESPONSA ZEKAN AHARON 2 no. 97; see also STEINsupra note 1, at 152.
8. See STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 153.
9. MISHNAH YEVAMOT 6:6; see also DAVID M. FELDMAN, MARITAL RELATIONS,
BIRTH CONTROL AND ABORTION IN JEWISH LAW 46-59 (1974).
10. TUREI ZAHAV, EVEN HAEZER 1:8; RESPONSA MISHPETEI UZIEL, EVEN
HAEZER no. 19; RESPONSA YASKIL AVDI 5, EVEN HAEZER no. 10.
11. RESPONSA MINHAT YITZHAK 1 no. 50; RESPONSA YABIA OMER 2, EVEN
HAEZER no. 1; RESPONSA ZIz ELIEZER 3 no. 27.
12. See Isaiah 45:18; MISHNAH EDUYYOT 1:13; TALMUD BAVLI YEVAMOT 62a;
FELDMAN, supra note 9, at 48; NISHMAT AVRAHAM, EVEN HAEZER 1:9 (citing R.
Shlomo Zalman Auerbach).
BERG,
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quences of infertility in observant circles. In these circles, children
are an extremely important focus of religious, and hence, social
practice. Sensitivity to the social, as well as the halakhic pressures
on observant Jewish married couples to have children, undoubtedly
contributes to the trend amongst halakhic authorities to find ways
13
of resolving fertility problems.
It is significant that the prohibitionist authorities do not raise any
fundamental ideological objection to the use of assisted reproduction on the grounds that it is not a natural process. Their objections are based upon specific legal prohibitions and upon
reservations regarding the fulfillment of the positive commandment to reproduce. It would, therefore, appear to be unanimously
accepted that there is no fundamental requirement in Jewish law
that reproduction take place in a purely natural manner.
This approach is in marked contrast with that of Catholic Church
doctrine, which prohibits any intrusion of technology into human
reproduction. As a result, artificial insemination, using either the
husband's sperm or donor sperm, and in vitro fertilization, are not
options for a Catholic married couple struggling with an infertility
problem. According to the Catholic doctrine, as laid down in the
1987 Instruction on Respect for Human Life in its Origins and on
the Dignity of Procreation,(Donum Vitae), 4 it is forbidden to separate procreation from marital sex. This provision, often referred to
as the "inseparability principle," requires that children must only
come into being as a result of marital intercourse, and that any
reproductive method that replaces intercourse as the cause of
human generation is immoral. 5 The inseparability principle is
based upon the idea that children born in any context other than
that of marital love will be adversely affected in terms of their own
capacities to love and be loved. Additionally, there is the fear that
artificial reproductive techniques may be easily abused. 6 Thus, the
Catholic approach is a naturalist one; Donum Vitae gives strong
13. See The Longing for Children in a TraditionalJewish Family, in BE
AND MULTIPLY: FERTILITY THERAPY AND THE JEWISH TRADITION

FRUITFUL

5-11 (Richard V.

Grazi ed., 1994).
14. U.S. CATHOLIC

CONFERENCE, CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE
FAITH, INSTRUCTION ON RESPECT FOR HUMAN LIFE IN ITS ORIGIN AND ON THE DIGNITY OF PROCREATION, DONUM VITAE 11 (1987) [hereinafter DONUM VITAE].

15. See RICHARD A. MCCORMICK, THE CRITICAL CALLING: REFLECTIONS ON
MORAL DILEMMAS SINCE VATICAN II 333 (1989); see also P. Hannam, In Vitro Fertilization, 55 IRISH THEOLOGICAL Q. 14 (1989).
16. See MCCORMICK, supra note 15, at 347-49. An example of abuse is the replacement of the husband's sperm with that of a donor.
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expression to this idea, and the dominant Catholic view is that artificial insemination by the husband is forbidden.
Mention should be made of a minority Catholic view that regards the total ban on assisted conception in Donum Vitae as being
too strong an application of the inseparability principle. According
to this view, where a married couple is desperate to have their own
child and looks to assisted reproduction as the means for achieving
this end, the act of reproduction becomes imbued with the same
ingredient of marital love as that which suffuses the act of marital
intercourse, and AIH should, therefore, be permitted. 17 Regarding
the fear of abuse, the argument offered by the liberal Catholic minority is that this fear may be met by a combination of religious
sanctions and practical precautionary measures. It should not, in
and of itself, provide the basis for a universal ban on artificial reproduction in all circumstances. 8
It is noteworthy that Islamic law in this area resembles Jewish
law, in that it too has no principled opposition to the use of artificial reproductive techniques in overcoming a fertility problem
within a marriage. AIH is, therefore, permitted under Islamic
law.' 9

The case against naturalism in the halakhah should not be made
too strongly. Indeed, it may be argued that the naturalist approach
manifests itself in the view that while AIH is not halakhically prohibited, it is not on par with the natural method with respect to
qualifying as a means of fulfilling the mitzvah of procreation on a
biblical level. This downgrading of the religious validity of AIH
may very well serve as evidence of a weak form of naturalism in
this area of Jewish law. The term "weak naturalism" indicates that
although the halakhah does not designate naturalism in this area as
a legal value, there are features of the halakhic doctrine that are
compatible with the naturalist approach.
R. Immanuel Jakobovits expresses a strong naturalist position
with regard to artificial reproductive technology in relation to artificial insemination using donor sperm ("AID"). As described infra, both the legal and moral ramifications of AID are far more
serious than those of AIH. As a result, legal permission, when
17. See THOMAS A. SHANNON & LISA S. CAHILL, RELIGION AND ARTIFICIAL REPRODUCTION 111-15, 127-39 (1988); see also MCCORMICK, supra note 15, at 348.
18. See MCCORMICK supra note 15, at 348.
19. See VARDIT RISPLER-CHAIM, ISLAMIC MEDICAL ETHICS IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY 18-27 (1993). Islamic law insists that safeguards be adopted to prevent any
donor semen from destroying the purity of the husband's line. Id.
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given, is often qualified by reservations of a moral nature, including concern for the preservation of the family unit. Nevertheless,
for the purposes of R. Jakobovits's naturalist argument, the fact
that it is made in the context of AID is not critical, since its force is
equally applicable to AIH. R. Jacobovits notes that although there
is nothing intrinsically illegal about AID, it is, nevertheless, opposed by the majority of halakhic authorities on moral grounds.
According to R. Jakobovits, this moral opposition may be explained by the fact that the use of artificial reproductive techniques
turns childbearing into a "mechanical" act, bereft of "those mystical and intimately human qualities that make man a partner with
God in the creative propagation of the race."2 The reference to
the "mechanical" nature of AID is highly reminiscent of the naturalist theory underlying the inseparability doctrine of the Catholic
Church. In using these terms to describe the moral reservations on
the part of halakhists towards AID, R. Jakobovits uses the naturalist discourse, which would undoubtedly speak to the readers of his
path-breaking English language book on Jewish medical ethics. In
this respect, it may be significant that the book was written in
London and Dublin, and contains numerous references of a comparative nature to both Catholic and Protestant positions.
It is noteworthy that there is also one contemporary authority on
Islamic law who maintains that a child born using artificial techniques lacks "feelings and human warmth." According to this one
21
view, all artificial reproduction is prohibited.
There is, nevertheless, a significant difference between the weak
form of naturalism in the downgrading of AIH reproduction to the
level of merely fulfilling a rabbinic precept, and the principled objection to the use of reproductive techniques along Catholic lines.
Indeed, the former may be understood as a response to the challenges mounted by reproductive technology to many of the traditional legal and moral underpinnings of family and society; it is
clearly not a principled rejection. If the effect of this and other
halakhic reservations regarding reproductive technology is to introduce a note of caution into its use, then weak naturalism may prove
to be a wise course indeed. The important point is that it does not
close off the technological option to couples who seek reproductive
assistance. At the end of the day, even serious misgivings regarding the effect of a particular technology upon society as a whole are
20. IMMANUEL JAKOBOVITS, JEWISH MEDICAL
21. See RISPLER-CHAIM, supra note 19, at 24.

ETHICS

248-49 (1975).
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not strong enough to render an otherwise legally and morally acceptable method beyond the pale of the halakhah.
A final point with regard to the downgrading of the religious
status of AIH is its role in ensuring that the new technology will
not become a tool of abuse in the hands of an unscrupulous spouse.
One of the practical halakhic ramifications of the downgrading is
that if one or both parties in an infertile marriage do not wish to
pursue assisted reproduction for understandable reasons, they are
not obliged to do so. Indeed, they may even claim that in the absence of any possibility of fulfilling a biblical commandment by
means of AIH, they are adopting the most virtuous course by refraining from it. In other words, AIH may not be invoked by one
party to a marriage as a means of obtaining a divorce on the
grounds that refusal to undergo it is tantamount to nullifying the
biblical commandment to propagate, which is fundamental grounds
for divorce in Jewish law.22 At the same time, not only is a couple
struggling hard to overcome a fertility problem permitted to engage in AIH; with the production of a child they will even have a
rabbinic mitzvah to their credit. The rabbinic status of procreation
achieved by means of AIH provides the basis for an element of
choice in this area, which might not be the case if AIH were held to
23
be a valid means for fulfilling the biblical obligation to procreate.
In this respect, an effort is made to ensure that a technology of
hope is not turned into a tool of abuse.
II.

ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION USING DONOR SPERM ("AID")
24
AND THE ISSUES OF ADULTERY AND MAMZERU1

From a legal point of view, the use of donor sperm in artificial
insemination (AID) poses many more problems than insemination
carried out using the husband's sperm (AIH). Amongst these
problems are adultery, mamzerut, the possibility of incest between
children of the sperm donor from different mothers, and a whole
range of problems in the areas of family and succession law resulting from the fact that the origin of the AID child might not be a
matter of public knowledge. At the same time, however, AID is
the most widely practiced form of artificial insemination, and it is
22. See THE PRINCIPLES OF JEWISH LAW 418 (Menachem Elon ed., 1974).
23. J. DAVID BLEICH, BIOETHICAL DILEMMAS 207-08, 241 (1998).

24. A mamzer is the product of an adulterous or incestuous union, and may not
marry another Jew. He may marry another mamzer or a convert but in both cases, the
product is another mamzer. See THE PRINCIPLES OF JEWISH LAW, supra note 22, at

435-38.
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often the only solution for a wide range of fertility problems, including total male infertility, low sperm counts, complications arising out of incompatibility between a couple's blood types,
especially the Rh factor, and problems relating to the immune system in the reproductive organs. AID is also used as a last resort in
cases in which there seems to be no apparent reason for an infertility problem. It has been estimated that thirty percent of infertility
cases are due to deficiencies in the male reproductive system. 25
AID may often be the only hope for an infertile couple yearning
for a child who is genetically related to the mother, and who she
can carry in her womb through a full pregnancy culminating in
birth. The tragedy of infertility and its special significance for traditional Jewish families was referred to in relation to AIH, and it is
no less relevant in the present context.
The gravest legal issue relating to AID is that of adultery and the
consequences for the children of an adulterous union. The
halakhic answer to the question of whether or not AID constitutes
adultery turns on a Talmudic passage dealing with the permissibility of a marriage between a high priest and a pregnant virgin.
Under biblical law, a high priest is required to marry a virgin.26 In
the Talmud, the following question is posed: Is a virgin who happens to be pregnant permitted to a high priest or not? In attempting to provide this scenario with some factual basis, the Talmud
suggests that a virgin may become pregnant as a result of entering
a bath into which a man had recently discharged his semen.27 It
should be made clear that for our purposes, the significance of the
discussion lies in the light it seeks to shed on the legal definition of
sexual offenses in Jewish law, and not in the history or physiology
of virgin conception. The question which the Talmud is seeking to
answer is whether, in relation to the issue of marriage to a high
priest, a woman ceases to be a virgin only as a result of having had
intercourse with a man, or is becoming pregnant sufficient to deprive her of her virginal status, even in the absence of any act of
intercourse?
If the answer is that virgin status is lost only as a result of intercourse, the pregnant virgin would be permitted to marry the high
25. See STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 149.
26. Leviticus 21:13.
27. TALMUD BAVLI HAGIGAH 14b-15a. Although some earlier authorities believed in the possibility of bathtub conception (RABBEINU HANANEL, TALMUD BAVLI
HAGIGAH 15a; TASHBEZ 3 no. 263), the majority of halakhists deny the possibility of
conception taking place in such circumstances. See OZAR HAPOSKIM 1 no. 42.
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priest, and more importantly, a general rule may be derived to the
effect that in all sexual offenses, the physical element of the crime
is intercourse and not impregnation. Thus, a married Jewish woman who is impregnated by the semen of a Jewish man other than
her husband, without having had sexual relations with him, is not
an adulteress. If, on the other hand, the answer is that pregnancy is
incompatible with virginity, then the virgin is prohibited to the high
priest. The general rule would then be that impregnation alone is
sufficient to constitute the physical element of sexual offenses such
as adultery and incest.
Both Rashi and Tosafot interpret the passage such that the conclusion is that intercourse rather than pregnancy renders a virgin
unsuitable for marriage with a high priest.28 The majority of
halakhic authorities would also appear to adopt this view of the
passage and accept the conclusion that a high priest is permitted to
marry a pregnant virgin. The rule which emerges from this interpretation is that sexual intercourse alone and not impregnation,
constitutes the physical element in the definition of sexual offenses
such as adultery and incest in Jewish law.29
Another important halakhic source for this issue is a ruling by R.
Perez of Corbeil, a French Tosafist, in relation to a woman who
becomes pregnant during her menstrual period. Under Jewish law,
sexual relations between a husband and wife are forbidden during
menstruation. 30 R. Perez addresses the scenario of a married menstruant who becomes pregnant as a result of lying on her husband's
sheets shortly after his having ejaculated semen onto them. According to R. Perez, there is no question of any breach of Jewish
law here, since no actual intercourse has taken place. 31 However,
28. RASHi, TALMUD BAVLI SHABBAT 151, sub voce ushmuel amar;TOSAFOT, TALMUD BAVLI KETUBOT 6b, verse rov beki'in; TALMUD BAVLI NIDDAH 64b, sub voce
sha'ani Shmuel; see also R. Benzion Firrer, RegardingArtificial Procreation,3 NOAM
295-99 (1964) (discussing the opinion of Tosafot in TALMUD BAVLI HAGIGAH 14b,
sub voce betulah sheibrah, and how it is in line with the other two Tosafot mentioned
here). R. Firrer bases his view upon a textual emendation proposed by R. Joel Sirkes
in his HAGAHOT HABAH ON TALMUD BAVLI HAGIGAH.

29. See TASHBEZ 3 no. 263; SHE'ELAT YA'AVEZ no. 96; HELKAT MEHOKEK, EVEN
HAEZER 1:6; BETH SHMUEL, EVEN HAEZER 1:10; RESPONSA SERIDEI ESH 3 no. 5;
RESPONSA YABIA OMER, EVEN HAEZER 1 no. 6; see also Fred Rosner, Artificial Insemination in Jewish Law, in JEWISH BIOETHICS 111 (Fred Rosner & J. David Bleich
eds., 1979). But see MISHNEH LEMELEKH, HILKHOT ISHUT 16:4; TUREI ZAHAV, EVEN
HAEZER 1:18; RESPONSA Ziz ELIEZER 3 no. 27.
30. See STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 1141-48 (stating that the offspring of such
intercourse are not subject to any purely legal disqualification).
31. In the course of the gloss as cited in BAYIT HADASH, YOREH DEAH 195, reference is made to a legend with regard to the conception of Ben Sira, whose book is to
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he goes on to say that a married woman must avoid lying on the

semen-covered sheet of a man other than her husband. The reason
for this is that if she does become pregnant and give birth, the resulting child may one day marry the progeny of his biological father, thereby committing incest. Any child of this marriage would

then be a mamzer.3 2 R. Perez's ruling that a married woman must
not lie on the sheet of another man is based solely upon the fear of
possible incest. There is no indication that, in the absence of sexual
intercourse, conception from a stranger's semen constitutes adultery. Indeed, in the absence of any such indication, it may be as-

sumed that intercourse alone, and not impregnation, constitutes
the defining physical element in the offense of adultery in Jewish
law.
Two significant points emerge from R. Perez's ruling. The first is
a reiteration of the principle implicit in the Talmudic discussion of
the high priest and the pregnant virgin that impregnation alone
does not constitute the defining physical element of sexual offenses
under Jewish law. The second is that the progeny of a married wo-

man conceived as a result of her lying on a sheet covered with another man's semen is not a mamzer: Since no act of intercourse is
involved, the child is completely free of the taint of mamzerut.

The sole reason for prohibiting the married woman from lying
on another man's sheets is the fear of possible incest. It is only this
be found in the Apocrypha. According to this legend, Simon ben Sira was conceived
as a result of the prophet Jeremiah being forced into an act of onanism in a bath and
his daughter having been impregnated with his semen as a result of entering the bath
after he left. MIDRASH ALEF BETH DEBEN SIRA 43 (Y. Eisenstein ed., 1928); see also
STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 548-50. The legend supports the notion that bathtub
conception cannot give rise to mamzerut since Ben Sira, notwithstanding his origin,
was a "perfectly legitimate Jew" ("kasher hayah"). This legend appears in various
halakhic works. See, e.g., LIKKUTEI MAHARIL no. 5; TASHBEZ 3 no. 263; HELKAT
MEHOKEK, EVEN HAEZER 1:18; BIRKEI YOSEF, EVEN HAEZER 1:14; PAHAD YIZHAK,

sub voce ben bito; RESPONSA YABIA OMER, EVEN HAEZER 8 no. 21. R. Ovadiah
Yosef uses this legend to prove that the child of a married Jewish woman who underwent AID using Jewish sperm is not a mamzer. But see RESPONSA Ziz ELIEZER 9 no.
51; JAKOBOVITS, supra note 20, at 247-48 (denying the legend carries any serious legal
weight).
32. Jewish law only recognizes natural parenthood, therefore, the father of an artificially inseminated child is always the sperm donor. See Michael J. Broyde, The Establishment of Maternity and Paternity in Jewish and American Law, 3 NAT'L JEWISH
L. REV. 117, 118-19 (1988). R. Perez's ruling is cited in BAYIT HADASH, YOREH
DEAH 195; SHILTE! HAGIBORIM, TALMUD BAVLI SHEVUOT ch. 2; BIRKEI YOSEF,
EVEN HAEZER 1:14; see also MAIMONIDES, COMMENTARY TO THE MISHNAH, SANHEDRIN 7:4 (holding that mamzerut is established even if the parents were unaware that
their relationship was incestuous).
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possibility that accounts for R. Perez's warning that a married woman must not lie on another man's sheets.
R. Perez's opinion is cited by all the major commentators on the
Shulhan Arukh 33 and it provides the primary supporting source for
the many authorities who rule that in the absence of sexual intercourse, the insemination of a married woman with donor sperm
does not constitute adultery.34
There is no indication that R. Perez's discussion was related to
an actual case. Indeed, the idea that pregnancy could be brought
about other than by means of sexual intercourse was simply not
accepted by most halakhists as a practical possibility.35 In the midtwentieth century, however, things changed. With the advent of
artificial insemination, the issue of conception without intercourse
became a highly relevant halakhic topic, and the subject of a
heated debate between two prominent North American authorities, R. Moses Feinstein and R. Yoel Teitelbaum.36 The debate began with a question posed to R. Feinstein concerning an infertile
couple who were desperate to have a child. The problem clearly
lay in the husband's lack of viable sperm. R. Feinstein, following
the position in the Talmud and R. Perez, concluded that there was
no issue of adultery in relation to donor sperm, and permitted the
couple to undergo AID in a local fertility clinic. 37 To overcome the
problem of potential incest, upon which R. Perez's strict ruling regarding a married woman lying on another man's sheets is based,
R. Feinstein confined his permissive ruling to a non-Jewish sperm
donor. The reason for this is that non-Jewish paternity is legally
33. TUREI ZAHAV, EVEN HAEZER 1:5; HELKAT MEHOKEK, EVEN HAEZER 1:8;
BETH SHMUEL, EVEN HAEZER, 1:10.
34. See, e.g., RESPONSA SHOEL UMESHIV 3 no. 132; RESPONSA MISHPETEI UZIEL,
EVEN HAEZER no. 19; RESPONSA SERIDEi ESH 3 no. 5; RESPONSA MENAHEM MESHIV
no 26; RESPONSA IGGROT MOSHE, EVEN HAEZER 1 no 71; R. Shlomo Zalman
Auerbach, Artificial Insemination, 1 NOAM 145 (1958); see also STEINBERG, supra note
1, at 154.
35. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
36. In fact, a couple of years earlier, the topic of AID was the theme of an entire
volume of the halakhicjournal (1 NOAM 145), but it was R. Feinstein's practical decision which raised a storm in the rabbinic world. It is noteworthy that in that volume,
R. Auerbach ruled leniently on the status of a married woman who underwent AID
using Jewish sperm, although he did declare that the offspring would be a doubtful
mamzer, and he condemned the option of using non-Jewish sperm on both moral and
ideological grounds.
37. RESPONSA IGGROT MOSHE, EVEN HAEZER 1 no. 71. It is noteworthy that R.
Feinstein refers to a view cited in the OZAR HAPOSKIM 1:42 that "AID using Jewish
sperm constitutes adultery and any children will be mamzerim" but dismisses it on the
grounds that "it is clearly not possessed of any halakhic weight."
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irrelevant under the halakhah. Jewish children fathered by a nonJew share no legally significant relationship with each other on the
paternal side, and are free to marry each other without any fear of
transgressing the prohibition on incest.38 Indeed, even if the nonJewish sperm donor were to convert to Judaism, marry a Jewish
woman and one of the children of this marriage was to marry a
"product" of the AID in which he had participated prior to marriage, no act of incest will have been committed. Because he was
non-Jewish at the time of the AID, he was incapable of establishing
any legally significant paternal link with his offspring under Jewish
law. In R. Feinstein's view, it is safe to assume that the majority of
sperm in North American sperm banks and fertility clinics is of
non-Jewish origin. Hence, the couple in question may use the services of any sperm bank in order to help solve their fertility problem and avoid the breakdown of their marriage.
According to R. Feinstein there is no question of adultery or
mamzerut in relation to AID, even if the sperm comes from a Jewish donor. It is only because of fear of possible incest between the
AID child and other children of the same donor that his permissive
ruling is confined to non-Jewish sperm. The majority of authorities
appear to support the purely legal aspect of R. Feinstein's approach, 39 although, as will be pointed out in the following Section,
they distance themselves from it on moral grounds.
R. Feinstein's ruling came under heavy attack from a number of
halakhic authorities. 40 R. Yoel Teitelbaum, a staunch traditionalist,
became R. Feinstein's primary protagonist on this matter. Accord38. TALMUD BAVLI YEVAMOT 45b; MAIMONIDES, HILKHOT ISSUREI BIAH
TUR, EVEN HAEZER 16; SHULHAN ARUKH, EVEN HAEZER 4:1.

15:3;

39. See STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 156-57. Regarding the issue of mamzerut, R.
Auerbach maintains that the product of AID using Jewish sperm is a doubtful
mamzer. Auerbach, supra note 34. According to R. Yehiel Weinberg, its status is that
of a shetuki, one whose father is unknown. RESPONSA SERIDEI ESH 3 no. 5; see also
THE PRINCIPLES OF JEWISH LAW, supra note 22, at 437. A shetuki is treated as a
doubtful mamzer, but unlike the latter, its status may be resolved by the mother's
statement regarding the identity of the father, or by a statistical analysis of the semen
donors at the clinic attended by the mother.
40. The American halakhic journal Hamaor published a number of articles between 1961 and 1965 heaping criticism upon R. Feinstein in both halakhic and personal terms. Indeed, the author of the journal saw fit to state that R. Feinstein's strict
rulings in other areas were undoubtedly to be relied upon, because if even he could
not permit, then the matter under discussion was surely prohibited beyond a shadow
of doubt! His lenient rulings, however, needed to be treated most circumspectly since
"his capacity for leniency exceeds that of the most lenient authorities in Israel." R.
Meir Amsel, Further Important Details Regarding Artificial Insemination, 16:1
HAMAOR 147 (1965).
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ing to R. Teitelbaum,41 the halakhic prohibition on adultery is defined in terms of causing lineage confusion, i.e., uncertainty with
regard to the father, as well as forbidden intercourse. This idea is
derived from a point made by Nahmanides to the effect that the
word "for seed" is the biblical prohibition on adultery: "And you
shall not lie carnally for seed with your neighbor's wife, "42 carries
the implication that lineage confusion is an inherent element in the
definition of the offense.
Nahmanides's interpretation is, in fact, cited by the author of the
Sefer Hahinukh, an explanatory work on the Divine commandments, as an important reason for the prohibition on adultery. 43 R.
Teitelbaum gives the Sefer Hahinukh's purely explanatory comment halakhic force, and argues that an act of lineage confusion
constitutes adultery under Jewish law even in the absence of sexual
intercourse. Since AID raises doubts as to the child's paternity, R.
Teitelbaum regards it as an act of adultery under biblical law.
R. Teitelbaum distinguishes between a case in which impregnation was purely accidental, as in the case of a woman lying upon
sheets containing semen, and a planned pregnancy as in the case of
AID. In R. Teitelbaum's view, R. Perez's statement that "since no
act of intercourse is involved, the child is completely free of the
taint of mamzerut" is based upon the fact that the semen-ejaculator
did not intend to impregnate the woman in question, and she did
not intend to become pregnant as a result of lying on his sheets.
The pregnancy was completely unplanned. This is the only reason
that it is not considered adultery, and the child is not a mamzer.
Thus, R. Perez's ruling may not be used to free the product of deliberate insemination from the taint of mamzerut, as it only applies
to chance insemination.44
41. RESPONSA DIVREI YOEL, EVEN HAEZER no. 107-10. R. Eliezer Waldenberg
also adopts his view. RESPONSA Ziz ELIEZER 9 no. 51.
42. Leviticus 18:20. Nahmanides observes that the word "for seed" (Hebrew:
"lezara") might be used "in order to mention the reason for the prohibition on adultery, i.e., it will not be known to whom the child belongs, and as a result, great and
wicked abominations might be done by both father and child." In fact, Nahamanides
only raised this interpretation as a possibility. He continues, that in his view "the

correct interpretation" of the word is to emphasize that the sin is not merely lying
with a forbidden woman, but lying with her in such a way that it is an act of sexual
intercourse capable of bringing a child into the world. See NAHAMANIDES, COMMENTARY ON THE TORAH.

43. SEFER HAHINUKH, YITRo no. 5.
44. R. Teitelbaum provides a similar explanation for finding that Ben Sira was
perfectly legitimate, notwithstanding his highly dubious origin. See supra note 31.
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The problem with this argument is that nothing in R. Perez's text
indicates that the crucial issue with which he is dealing is the intention of the parties, rather than the physical definitions of the offenses of sexual relations with a menstruant and adultery. Indeed,
he states quite clearly, "since no act of intercourse is involved, the
child is completely free of the taint of mamzerut." If the real reason for avoiding the taint of mamzerut was the lack of intention to
transfer the semen from the man to the married woman by means
of the sperm-covered sheet, then this should have been indicated in
the text. Also, the role of intention in relation to the law of
mamzerut is unclear. It is established law that the child of a woman
who mistakenly believed her husband to have died, and, on that
basis, was permitted to remarry by a rabbinical court, will, upon
the reappearance of her first husband, be declared an adulteress
45
and her children from the second marriage declared mamzerim.
This law suggests that mamzerut is defined solely in physical terms
and that mental intention is irrelevant.
Perhaps sensing the weakness of the argument from lack of intention, R. Teitelbaum goes on to claim that the offense of adultery
must be understood on many levels, some of which are only comprehensible to the mystics:
And, in truth, there are many more hidden reasons than revealed ones and they are only known to the mystics. Indeed,
there are such lofty matters involved in the commandments that
no human being is capable of fathoming their entire signifi46
cance.
It is, therefore, dangerous to rely upon a purely rational understanding of halakhah, especially in relation to an offense as serious
as adultery. In R. Teitelbaum's view, "the correct approach is to
exercise great caution before permitting any course of action,
which might even conceivably constitute the crime of adultery."
R. Teitelbaum also criticizes R. Feinstein in terms of the theory
of halakhic decision-making. R. Feinstein's halakhic decisions are
almost always based directly upon Talmudic sources. He does not
generally pay much attention to later commentators or codifiers.
R. Teitelbaum cites the ancient debate between those authorities
who arrive at their decisions on the basis of the Talmud alone, and
those who interpret those sources on the basis of later halakhic
45. See ARUKH SHULHAN, EVEN HAEZER 17:56; see also THE PRINCIPLES OF JEWsupra note 22, at 412.
46. RESPONSA DIVREI YOEL, supra note 41. See generally Lasker, supra note 3

ISH LAW,

(regarding the influence of mysticism in this area of halakhah).
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codices.4 7 He prefers the view of R. Joseph ibn Migash, the principal spokesman of the second of the above-mentioned schools of
thought, who maintains that it is more appropriate to arrive at
halakhic rulings with the aid of later gaonic responsa, than to rely
solely upon the Talmud, since "there is no scholar in our times who
is able to fathom the true meaning of the Talmud without the aid of
gaonic commentaries. '4 8 In R. Teitelbaum's view, this statement of
R. Joseph ibn Migash applies even more strongly in contemporary
times "when halakhic knowledge in general is at a high premium
and a profound understanding of all its levels is virtually non-existent." Regretfully, there are "contemporary authors who, on the
basis of vain and unsubstantiated inferences from the Talmud, produce terrible leniencies in the strictest of matters such as adultery
and mamzerut."4 9 R. Teitelbaum's conclusion is that AID constitutes adultery and any resulting children will be mamzerim.
R. Feinstein responded to the entire range of R. Teitelbaum's
criticisms in another responsum on AID in Jewish law.5" Regarding the definition of adultery, R. Feinstein insists that a strict distinction must be made between sexual intercourse, which is the
physical element in the offense of adultery, and lineage confusion,
the avoidance of which may or may not be an extra-halakhic,peripheral dimension of the prohibition. R. Feinstein makes his point
by observing that acceptance of lineage confusion as a core legal
element in the offense of adultery may well lead to the patently
false argument that adultery with an infertile woman is not illegal,
since there is no danger of lineage confusion in such a case.5
Clearly, sexual intercourse alone constitutes the sole core element
in the offense of adultery; lineage confusion is at best, a peripheral,
extra-halakhic dimension of the offense. R. Feinstein also argues
that the major source used by R. Teitelbaum for the idea that lineage confusion constitutes an integral part of the offense of adultery, Nahmanides's Commentary on the Torah, is not, strictly
speaking, a halakhically authoritative work. As such, there is no
genuinely normative basis for R. Teitelbaum's major legal argument in favor of including lineage confusion in the biblical offense
47. See MENACHEM ELON, JEWISH LAW 1229-31 (1994).
48. R. JOSEPH IBN MIGASH, RESPONSA Ri MIGASH no. 114. The Gaonim were
post-talmudic authorities located mainly in Babylon who originated the halakhic literary genres of codes and responsa in an effort to summarize and consolidate the vast
body of Talmudic law. See ELON, supra note 47, at 42-43, 1150-67, 1468-73.
49. RESPONSA DIVREI YOEL, EVEN HAEZER no. 110.
50. RESPONSA IGGROT MOSHE, EVEN HAEZAR 2 no. 11.

51. See

ABRAHAM IBN EZRA,

Leviticus 18:20.
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of adultery.52 Moreover, R. Feinstein argues that the remark about
lineage confusion and adultery may be the work of an errant disci53
ple, and not of Nahmanides himself.
Regarding his general approach to decision-making, R. Feinstein
turns the tables on both R. Teitelbaum and his other critics by
claiming that whereas his ruling is based upon purely objective
halakhic analysis, their rulings are influenced by "external opinions," with the result that they "prohibit the permitted, and permit
the prohibited." He insists that halakhic rulings be evaluated according to objective legal criteria, and that lenient decisions are not
refuted purely on the grounds of their leniency.
All my opinions are based solely upon the knowledge of the Torah and are completely free of any external ideas. For the laws
of the Torah are true whether their effect is to be strict or to be
lenient. There is no halakhic validity whatsoever in external
ideas or inclinations of the mind, even if they lead to a strict
ruling. The idea that a strict result is necessarily purer and more
holy than a lenient one is false.54
R. Feinstein does not elaborate on the "external ideas" ulion
which his protagonists in the contemporary debate rely. Presumably, one of them is the notion that it is always better to err on the
side of strictness when confronting a novel situation, as in the case
of AID. Another is the use of a whole range of non-halakhic arguments commonly used by his contemporary opponents to refute his
position. The feature common to all these "external ideas" is their
52. The halakhic status of Nahmanides's Commentary on the Torah is a matter of
YECHEZKEL LANDAU, RESPONSA NODA BIYEHUDA 2, YOREH DEAH
no. 28; Daniel Sinclair, The Status of Human Healingand Coercive Medical Treatment
in Jewish Law 18-19, in SHENATON HAMISHPAT HAIVRI 270 (1992-94). It ought to be

debate. See R.

noted that Nahmanides only offers lineage confusion as one possible explanation of
the phrase in question. See supra note 42. It is also evident that according to Maimonides, any law derived from Leviticus 18:20 is restricted to the male adulterer and
would not apply to a female. See SEFER HAMITZVOT, NEGATIVE COMMANDMENTS no.
347.

53. The "errant disciple" or "forger" is not an uncommon theme in R. Feinstein's
responsa. See RESPONSA IGGROT MOSHE, HOSHEN MISHPAT 1 no. 69 (discussing the
abortion of a Tay-Sachs fetus). It may be safely assumed that these claims are not
based upon historical research but are a formal device us 6d in order to remove the
tension between R. Feinstein's conclusions regarding any particular halakhic matter,
and the opposite view taken by less than leading precedents in that area. In the present case, the method is used with regard to Nahmanides's Commentary on the Torah
which, as pointed out in supra note 52, is not a primary halakhic source. Similarly, the

sources dismissed on the basis of this argument in the context of abortion are not
front rank decisors, as far as R. Feinstein and his classical approach to halakhic decision-making is concerned.
54. See supra note 52.
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lack of formal halakhic pedigree. He takes pains to point out that
until the onset of this debate, no significant halakhic authority had
ever adopted the view that a child produced by the product of AID
might be a mamzer. The few authorities that do represent a vast
minority and their views were, at best, of a tentative nature only:
They are, in fact, completely irrelevant, since they do not possess the normative authority of the more classical sources, and
their opinions are formed entirely on the basis of external factors, which are at odds with the very fundamentals of the laws
governing forbidden sexual relations as laid down in the Torah
and the Talmud."
R. Feinstein is clearly of the opinion that a strictly legal approach
is to be adopted in this area, and it should not be compromised by
non-halakhic sources.
R. Feinstein's opinion, therefore, remains unchanged, and in his
view there is no halakhic bar to AID provided that non-Jewish
sperm is used. Indeed, if the resulting child is female, there would
6
not even be any restriction on her marrying a kohen (priest).
In 1965, a book appeared in Brooklyn purporting to carry a retraction by R. Feinstein. In the book, he is reported to have stated
that his lenient decision is not to be relied upon in practice, since
he permitted the use of AID with non-Jewish sperm only in the
gravest of cases, and the discretion to decide whether a particular
case falls into this category is, in fact, beyond the capacity of even
the most experienced halakhic authority. 7 However, some twenty
years after his original debate with R. Teitelbaum, R. Feinstein obviously felt the need to reiterate his position on AID, and in another responsum on the topic, he emphasizes that everything which
he had written in his two earlier responsa is "true and clear law and
there is absolutely no basis for any retraction."5 8 He does, however, add that he did not always give practical rulings in accordance
with his view of the halakhah, but used his discretion in line with
considerations of a pastoral nature. R. Feinstein explains that it is
important to realize that AID may not bring a couple together, but
may instead drive them apart. In particular, without proper counseling, there is no guarantee that the husband of the inseminated
55. See supra note 52.
56. Priests are restricted in the type of women whom they are allowed to marry
and the daughter of a non-Jew falls within these restrictions. See THE PRINCIPLES OF
JEWISH LAW, supra note 22, at 361.
57. R. Zvi FREIDMAN, ZvI HEMED, kuntresim 41-43 (1965). This retraction is also

cited in
58.

RESPONSA Ziz ELIEZER 9 no. 51; RESPONSA HELKAT YAACOV
RESPONSA IGGROT MOSHE, EVEN HAEZER 4 no. 32.

3 no. 47.
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woman will accept the child. Since there are no halakhic grounds
for regarding AID as a compulsory procedure, as artificial insemination per se may not be a valid method for carrying out the biblical commandment to procreate, it should only be recommended to
couples who are properly prepared for receiving a child through
AID. Nevertheless, regarding its halakhic status, R. Feinstein reiterates his earlier position, and categorically states that if a couple
proceeds with AID using non-Jewish sperm, "the child is perfectly
legitimate and may even marry a kohen."
At the same time as R. Feinstein's original responsum was issued, R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach also argued that since the product of AID using non-Jewish sperm would be free of all legal
impediments, the use of the technique may well be permitted to a
couple "in dire need.''59 However, R. Auerbach's view was ex-

pressed in the form of a theoretical insight rather than a practical
ruling, and was accompanied by a stern warning to the effect that
his words were to be treated as a basis for experienced authorities
to use in future rulings and not as binding halakhah. This presumably saved it from becoming the focus of the type of criticism leveled at R. Feinstein's responsum. He also took care to express
strong reservations of a moral nature with regard to the use of nonJewish sperm.
Concerning the practical question of establishing the non-Jewish
origin of sperm obtained from a sperm bank, R. Feinstein relies
upon the fact that the majority of donors in a country like the
United States are non-Jewish. Hence, it may be assumed that the
sperm in any particular case will have come from a member of the
majority, i.e., a non-Jewish donor, and the problem of potential incest is, therefore, entirely avoided. R. Teitelbaum, on the other
hand, insists that a more stringent standard must be applied with
regard to lineage determination and hence, even if he were to accept R. Feinstein's argument regarding the definition of adultery,
he would still be unable to accept his lenient ruling, since the possibility of incest amongst the various children of the sperm donor
may only be discounted if it is definitely known that the donor
sperm is from a non-Jew. Since this was not the type of information generally given to an infertile couple requesting AID at the
time of the debate, the procedure may not be used.
R. Teitelbaum appears to be in the minority on this issue as well.
For example, even R. Weinberg, who maintains that AID using
59. See Auerbach, supra note 34.
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Jewish sperm results in a shetuki,6 ° a child with a known mother
but an unknown father and therefore, a doubtful mamzer, agrees
that if the sperm is non-Jewish, then, by virtue of the majority principle, the child is not subject to any legal defect.61 Therefore, in
terms of the purely legal consensus, R. Feinstein's solution appears
to be free of complications. It is, however, rejected by the majority
on moral grounds, as we will see in Part IV, infra.
Il.

OTHER HALAKHIC PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH

AID6"

Another halakhic problems associated with AID is the fear that
a woman whose husband was childless and who had conceived by
means of AID, might remarry upon the husband's death without
first obtaining halitzah from her brother-in-law. Under biblical
law, the widow of a man who died without any issue is required to
marry his brother in order to continue the line of her dead husband. The brother of the dead husband may, however, release her
from the levirate marriage in a ceremony called halitzah.63 She is
then free to marry whomever she pleases. Today, halitzah is the
norm and if the dead brother's wife does not carry it out, she may
not remarry. If she does remarry, her second husband is required
to divorce her.6 4 Clearly, if AID is permitted, a woman who gave
birth as a result of artificial insemination with donor sperm will, on
the death of her husband, be in a position to avoid halitzah by concealing the fact of her child's AID origin. Some authorities consider this possibility sufficiently grave as to provide a serious
objection to permitting AID.65 Others, such as R. Feinstein, argue
that the problem may be avoided by identifying AID children to
the rabbinic authorities responsible for registering marriages. Indeed, the lack of secrecy as to the halakhic identity of sperm donors and their offspring is an essential element in R. Feinstein's
liberal approach to AID.6 6
60. TALMUD BAVLI KIDDUSHIN 74a; MAIMONIDES, HILKHOT ISSUREI BIAH 15:12;
SHULHAN ARUKH, EVEN HAEZER 4-26; THE PRINCIPLES OF JEWISH LAW, supra note
22, at 437.
61. RESPONSA SERIDEI ESH 3 no. 5.
62. See STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 155 (providing a detailed list of problems).

63. Deuteronomy 25:5-6.
64. However her children from the second marriage will not be mamzerim. See
TALMUD BAVLI YEVAMOT 13b; MAIMONIDES, HILKHOT ISHUT 4:14; THE PRINCIPLES
OF JEWISH LAW, supra note 22, at 403-09.

65. RESPONSA ZEKAN AHARON 2 no. 97; RESPONSA ZIz ELIEZER 3 no. 27.
66. RESPONSA IGGROT MOSHE, EVEN HAEZER 1 no. 71.
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The possibility of concealing the fact that a particular child was
born through AID is also disturbing in relation to those areas of
Jewish law in which male lineage is a legally constitutive element.
In this context, it is important to note that Jewish law defines paternity in natural terms only.6 7 It does not recognize adoption as a

substitute for natural parenthood.68
One area in which the establishment of natural paternity is legally significant is the establishment of priestly identity. Priestly
status only passes to the male descendants of a priest. Therefore, if
the sperm donor is a non-priest, and the donee's husband is a
priest, their son is not entitled to priestly status. The husband may,
however, be tempted to conceal his son's origins and bring him up
as a priest. Similarly, if the sperm donor is a priest, his son will also
be a priest, and if the donee's husband is a non-priest, he may be
tempted to conceal the child's priestly identity in order to avoid
making the nature of his son's conception public knowledge. Once
again, modern halakhic authorities are divided over the seriousness
of this issue. Some see it as a serious objection to the use of AID,69
whereas others claim that it is easily overcome by requiring complete openness with regard to the use of AID in relation to all paternity related matters.7 °
Problems may also arise with respect to the establishment of the
actual paternity of an AID child. According to the majority of authorities, if the sperm donor is Jewish, he is the father in all respects, including priestly status and inheritance. 7' Other
authorities argue that because AID always has an element of uncertainty with regard to the identity of the sperm donor, he is only
considered the father with respect to stringencies, such as the ban
on sibling marriage. In all other respects, such as inheritance
rights, paternity is not established, and the child's lineage follows
that of its mother or maternal grandfather.72 This is yet another
issue in relation to which openness with regard to the fact that the
child in question was conceived using AID will solve the problem.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

See Broyde, supra note 32, at 118-19.
See THE PRINCIPLES OF JEWISH LAW, supra note 22, at 440.
RESPONSA MINHAT YIZHAK 6 no. 140.
See STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 155.
See TASHBETZ 3 no. 263; BETH SHMUEL, EVEN HAEZER 1:10; HELKAT
MEHOKEK, EVEN HAEZER 1:8; see also Auerbach, supra note 34, at 156.
72. TUREI ZAHAV, EVEN HAEZER 1:8; RESPONSA MISHPETEI UZIEL, EVEN
HAEZER no. 19; RESPONSA ZEKAN Aharon 2 no. 97; cf. Broyde, supra note 32, at 120
n.24 (citing authority holding that the Talmud implies through its silence that paternity is established through artificial insemination).
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In this context, it is noteworthy that the general trend today in
many jurisdictions throughout the world is to keep a register of
sperm donors, and to provide all relevant information to their AID
children. The primary purpose of such a register is to prevent incest and marriage within the prohibited degrees of affinity. Information may also be supplied in relation to the donor's ethnic type
and genetic health. There is as yet no generally accepted right of
an AID child to know the identity of her biological father. Under
Swedish law, however, a child does have the right to know the
identity of her sperm donor upon achieving the age of majority.7 3
IV.

MORAL OBJECTIONS TO

AID

The majority of halakhic authorities agree with R. Feinstein that
AID does not constitute full-blown adultery under Jewish law.
Nevertheless, they are opposed to it either because of the other
halakhic problems that it engenders, or on moral grounds. 4 Since
most, if not all, of the attendant halakhic problems related to AID
can be resolved with the full knowledge of the sperm donor's identity, we return to the point made by R. Jakobovits that the strong
opposition expressed by many modern authorities to AID is based
upon moral rather than legal considerations.7 5 In R. Jacobovits's
view, the major objection to AID is that it is a "mechanical act,"
bereft of the human qualities associated with the act of marital
love. This remark expresses the profound moral discomfort raised
by assisted reproduction. It also manifests a weak form of naturalism, which is discussed infra.
R. Yehiel Weinberg bases his opposition to AID on the notion
that the introduction of a stranger's semen, including that of a nonJew, into the womb of a married woman constitutes "an ugly act
and an abomination of Egypt. ' 76 The reference to "an abomination of Egypt" is biblical in origin, and the source is in the moral
prologue to the chapter in Leviticus dealing with the laws of forbidden sexual relations. These laws are introduced with a general
warning not to follow in the ways of the Egyptians and the
Canaanites, and not to practice any of their abominations.7 7 By
73. See J. KENYON MASON & ALEXANDER MCCALL SMITH, LAW AND MEDICAL
ETHICS 66-67 (1999).
74. See STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 154-55.
75. See JAKOBOVITS, supra note 20, at 248-49.
76. RESPONSA SERIDEI ESH 3 no. 5.
77. See Leviticus 18:3, 26-30; Ezekiel 23:19; see also ENCYCLOPEDIA MIKRAIT 46668 (1982).
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including AID in this general warning, and not in any of the specific prohibitions in the chapter, R. Weinberg indicates that while
there is no major halakhic prohibition against AID, it is mainly
forbidden on moral grounds. It is an offense against sexual mores
rather than sex laws.
R. Yaakov Breisch, with whom R. Weinberg corresponded on
this matter, adopts a similar approach. In common with the majority view, R. Breisch does not agree with R. Teitelbaum's view that
the product of AID is a mamzer, but he does maintain that "from
the perspective of our religion, it is clearly forbidden to do such
ugly things which are comparable to the deeds of the lands of
Egypt and Canaan and their abominations." R. Breisch adds that
AID is contrary to "religious sensibility in general."78 In this respect, he goes a little further than R. Weinberg, suggesting that
when the morality of AID is tested against the standard of "religious sensibility," it is generally found to be lacking. R. Breisch also
maintains that AID is contrary to the "spirit of Judaism." Presumably, his point here is that artificial insemination offends the traditional Jewish value of modesty in matters of sex and reproduction
by making public that which ought to remain private. This value is
central to the Jewish ethos, especially in its biblical setting, and
plays a highly significant role in distinguishing the Israelites from
the other nations-Egypt and Canaan-and in shaping their identity as a chosen people.79
R. Waldenberg, who maintains that it refers specifically to the
issue of lineage confusion, advances a more limited interpretation
of the category of "Egyptian and Canaanite abominations. "' 0 According to R. Waldenberg, it is a "great abomination" to introduce
another man's semen into a married woman's womb since, according to the Talmud, the Divine Presence only rests on offspring who
are certain of their lineage.81 It is noteworthy that he does not
adopt R. Teitelbaum's designation of lineage confusion as a legal
constituent of the biblical offense of adultery. As far as he is concerned, it is a purely moral offense, falling into the general rubric
of the "abominations of Egypt and Canaan."
The moral opposition on the part of many modern halakhic authorities to AID also focuses on R. Feinstein's suggestion that non78.

RESPONSA HELKHAT YAAKOV 1 no.

79. See

24.

SACHA STERN, JEWISH IDENTITY IN EARLY RABBINIC WRITINGS

(providing an anthropological-phenomenological study on this point).
80. RESPONSA Ziz ELIEZER 3 no. 27.
81. TALMUD BAVLI YEVAMOT 42a.
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Jewish sperm be used in order to avoid the problem of possible
incest. In addition to the idea that it offends against a wide range
of mystical concepts relating to the bio-spiritual disadvantages of
non-Jewish sperm, it is also stands accused of opening a back door
to assimilation.82 There is, indeed, something odd about the fact
that many Jews regard marrying a non-Jew as anathema, whereas a
prominent halakhic authority recommends the use of his sperm for
solving an infertility problem!
Nevertheless, the majority of authorities shy away from declaring a halakhic ban on non-Jewish donor sperm, and choose instead
to express strong moral and ideological disapproval of its use. In
practice, this means that a couple resorting to AID know in advance that there will be no serious halakhic problems resulting
from the procedure. Indeed, R. Breisch, who condemns AID using
non-Jewish sperm in very strong moral terms, takes pains to point
out that legally, sperm from a sperm-bank outside of Israel may be
assumed to be non-Jewish, and the resulting child will, therefore,
be free of any serious halakhic stigma.83 It is noteworthy that the
option of using R. Feinstein's approach is presented in a recent
handbook on fertility issues aimed at observant Jews in the United
States.84 In Israel, the availability of non-Jewish sperm is a special
feature of many Israeli fertility clinics. In this respect, observant
Jews are voting with their feet regarding AID, and tend to rely
upon R. Feinstein's approach in order to solve particularly pressing
fertility problems.
However, the moral dimension of artificial reproduction should
not be ignored. Since the future of this technology is shrouded in
uncertainty, as far as its full moral ramifications are concerned, the
sounding of a low note of caution may not be a bad thing. In addition to the issues raised in this Section, matters such as the traditional family structure, are implicated by this technology, and the
fear that it will, indeed, destroy this structure is one of the moral
82. See RESPONSA Ziz ELIEZER 3 no. 27; RESPONSA
no. 10; RESPONSA DIVREI YOEL no. 107-10.

YASKIL AVDI, EVEN HAEZER

83. RESPONSA HELKAT YAAKOV no. 24. This assumption is based upon the majority principle. See RESPONSA IGGROT MOSHE, EVEN HAEZER 1 no. 71.
84. See Richard V. Grazi & Joel B. Wolowelsky, New Ethical Issues, in BE FRUITsupra note 13, at 202-03. According to these writers, "a Jewish
couple who is sensitive to halakhic concerns should insist on obtaining donor semen
FUL AND MULTIPLY,

from a non-Jew. Not all couples are aware of this, and the physician should discuss
this in his or her counseling session." Id.
85. See Dvora Ross, Artificial Inseminationfor a Single Woman, in JEWISH
WRITINGS BY WOMEN

46 (Micah D. Halpern & Chana Safrai eds., 1998).
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arguments against AID raised by R. Jacobovits.86 His weak form
of naturalism, and the cautionary note it sounds in relation to the
use of reproductive technology, should, therefore, not go
unheeded.
V.

IN VITRO FERTILIZATION

("IVF")

Certain cases of female infertility may be overcome by using
IVF, a process in which egg production is stimulated hormonally,
and a number of eggs are fertilized with sperm in a glass dish.
Three to four fertilized eggs are typically implanted in a uterus, in
the hope that at least one will successfully be brought to term. Any
excess fertilized eggs are normally frozen for future use by the
couple undergoing IVF, or for purposes of donation.
Amongst modern authorities, R. Waldenberg is most strongly
opposed to IVF, even for a married couple using the wife's eggs
and implanting the embryos into her womb and not that of a surrogate.8 7 He raises a number of objections to the procedure, the first
of which relates to the offense of seed destruction. As already observed, AIH is often used to overcome the husband's infertility
stemming from anatomical defects in his sexual organ, or severe
psychological impotence. According to R. Waldenberg, the argument used in the context of AIH to justify a husband depositing his
seed outside of his wife's reproductive tract is that this is the only
way he can overcome his infertility problem, and fulfill his religious
obligation to reproduce. This argument fails in relation to IVF,
which in R. Waldenberg's opinion, is designed to deal exclusively
with female infertility. Since the obligation to propagate does not
apply to her,8 8 the husband is not justified in destroying his seed in
order to facilitate IVF.
Another objection raised by R. Waldenberg is that the grounds
for concern over the possibility of a sperm or embryo mix up are
more serious in relation to IVF, than they are in the case of artificial insemination. This is due to the time factor involved. In IVF,
both semen and egg are placed in a glass tube for a period of two to
three days. During that time, the egg is fertilized and placed in a
uterus. The period during which both the egg and the sperm are in
vitro is longer than with artificial insemination in which the sperm
is injected directly into the woman's reproductive tract. Hence, R.
86. See

JAKOBOVITS,

Ziz

supra note 20, at 248-49.

87.

RESPONSA

88.

MAIMONIDES, HILKHOT ISHUT

ELIEZER

15

no.

5.

15:2.
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Waldenberg's misgivings regarding the serious possibility of gamete or embryo mix up.
Finally, R. Waldenberg argues that because IVF takes place in a
test tube, the resulting child is totally without lineage, and has
neither a father, nor a mother under Jewish law. R. Waldenberg
uses this position to rule that the husband involved in IVF will not
have fulfilled any mitzvah, even on a rabbinical level, and he
should, therefore, avoid this procedure.
Now R. Waldenberg's point concerning the prohibition on seed
destruction in regards to AIH is contested by the majority of authorities who maintain that as long as the ultimate aim is procreation, the prohibition on seed destruction does not apply to either
AIH or IVF. 89 Also, as discussed supra, practical measures may be
taken in order to ensure that mix-ups of sperm and eggs do not
occur. In the light of these measures, the chances of sperm or eggs
being replaced are extremely small, and would not appear to justify
outlawing the procedure as a whole.
Regarding the total absence of lineage, the source of this idea
lies in a ruling by R. Menachem Azariah of Fano that the child of a
"strange combination has no lineage-neither paternal nor maternal-under Jewish law." 90 The context of R. Azariah's statement is
a marriage between a Jewish woman and a non-Jewish man. The
lack of paternal lineage in the case of a non-Jewish father is established halakhah, and plays a key role in R. Feinstein's allowance of
AID using non-Jewish sperm. The novelty of R. Azariah's ruling
lies in its denial of any maternal lineage to the child of this union.
However, the reason for this is the sinfulness of the union, and not
because of any "strangeness" connected with the physical process
of conception. The "strangeness" of the combination referred to
by R. Azariah, is the result of the commission of an offense. There
is no evidence that R. Azariah means to deprive a child born in a
physically "unnatural" way of its maternal lineage. The word
"strange" is used in a legal sense only. Nevertheless, R.
Waldenberg argues that the "strange combination" referred to by
R. Azariah includes any reproductive process in which the encounter between the egg and the sperm takes place outside of a woman's body. 91 As far as the establishment of maternity is
89. See supra Part I.
90. RESPONSA REMA MIFANO no. 116.
91. R. Malkiel Tenenbaum posited a similar argument in relation to artificial insemination, observing that "once semen has been emitted and has warmth only because of the ministration of the physician and his skill with the pipette or due to the

96

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. XXX

concerned, the notion that any artificiality in the course of fertilizing the mother's egg destroys the maternal link with the child is
completely unfounded, since under Jewish law, the maternal link is
established by birth, not gestation.92 The fact that the sperm and
the egg met in a glass dish is, therefore, irrelevant to the establishment of maternity.
It becomes evident that R. Waldenberg rejects IVF on the basis
of its unnaturalness. This is why he relies upon R. Azariah's phrase
"strange combination" as applied to an embryo or fetus. He
clearly regards the "strangeness" of the technology involved in IVF
as a negative phenomenon and expresses his disapproval of it by
putting the resulting child beyond the pale of the traditional family
framework. R. Azariah's minority ruling regarding a child of a
mixed couple, gives him the opportunity to base his opposition on
a precedent, even if that precedent is hardly a convincing one. In
this respect, R. Waldenberg's ruling is a clear instance of the intrusion of naturalism into the halakhah and, as such, it is not surprising that R. Waldenberg has remained a lone voice amongst
halakhists in this area.
R. Waldenberg's ruling prompted a firm rebuttal on the part of
R. Avigdor Nebenzahl, the rabbi of the Jewish Quarter of the Old
City of Jerusalem.93 R. Nebenzahl begins by pointing out the
human cost of prohibiting IVF to a couple desperate to conceive
their own child using the wife's eggs and womb. Such a course of
action could lead to divorce, and "the destruction of the family unit
in relation to the preservation of which, the Torah permitted the
holy Name of God to be washed away." 94 R. Nebenzahl repeats
the claim made by the permissive school in relation to AIH, arguing that the prohibition on the destruction of seed is inapplicable in
the context of fertility treatment involving a married couple. Since
the sole intention behind every act of seed emission in this context
heat of the bath" the resulting child is not regarded as being that of the sperm donor.
See RESPONSA DIVREI MALKIEL 4 no. 107. R. Tenenbaum's view is almost entirely
unique, and he himself does not rule in accordance with it. See J. DAVID BLEICH,
CONTEMPORARY HALAKHIC PROBLEMS 238-42 (1995).
92. See supra Part IV; see also BLEICH, supra note

91, at 239.
93. Observations on In Vitro Fertilization,in 5 SEFER AssIA 92-93 (M. Halperin
ed., 1987).
94. A reference to the ritual of the sotah, a wife suspected of adultery who was
compelled to swallow a drink containing a parchment slip with God's Name written
on it. Clearly, the liquid would erase the Divine Name, nevertheless, in order to restore peace between a man and his wife by proving that the woman had not committed adultery, the erasure of God's Name was permitted. See Numbers 5:11-31; see also
TALMUD BAVLI SHABBAT 116a.
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is to bring about the birth of a child, the concept of seed destruction is simply irrelevant.
Regarding R. Waldenberg's concern over the switching of eggs
and sperm, R. Nebenzahl maintains that whilst "the potential for
such abuse always exists, it would hardly seem right for the future
of a Jewish couple to be determined on the basis of a concern over
a purely potential abuse."
In a direct attack on R. Waldenberg's ruling that the artificiality
of artificial reproductive techniques per se deprives the resulting
offspring of all lineage, R. Nebenzahl points out that "we ought not
to follow external form, but ought to focus on inner content," and
as long as the aim is the fertilization of the egg, the mode of fertilization should be irrelevant. According to R. Nebenzahl, there
should be no distinction between the acceptance of modern technology with regard to, say, the mending of severed limbs, and its
application in relation to reproduction. Just as no one would suggest that the "artificiality" of artificial limbs offends the halakhic
mandate to heal, so too, modern reproductive technologies should
not be stripped of their therapeutic significance merely as a result
of their artificial nature.
R. Waldenberg's application of R. Azariah's concept of a
"strange combination" to the IVF offspring of a Jewish couple is
also disputed by R. Nebenzahl. The two cases are entirely different. R. Azariah deals with a forbidden relationship under Jewish
law, namely, a Jewish woman impregnated by a non-Jewish man.
IVF involving a Jewish married couple poses no such legal problem
and there is, therefore, no question of the child being a "strange
combination." Indeed, "both the husband and the wife in the case
of IVF are potentially capable of producing their own biological
child; all they need is a little help."
Two of the issues in the debate between R. Waldenberg and R.
Nebenzahl have merited a special introductory section in the entry
on IVF in Steinberg's Encyclopedia of Jewish Medical Ethics.95
The first issue is the virtue of naturalism so strongly espoused by R.
Waldenberg. According to Steinberg, "Judaism does not accept
the view that nature is supreme and that technology ought not to
be allowed to intervene in natural processes. On the contrary, man
is a partner with God and his role is to improve the world in all its
aspects." Steinberg goes further, and states that in the context of
medical therapy, there is a halakhic obligation to develop new
95.
(1991).

AVRAHAM STEINBERG, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JEWISH MEDICAL ETHICS
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technologies in order to conquer all manner of physical disability,
especially in an area in which the physical issue also affects the
relationship between man and wife.96
The second issue concerns the fear of abuse in the course of the
procedure and, in particular, the introduction of donor sperm and
the possibility of mixing gametes in vitro. R. Nebenhzahl rejects
the view that the existence of such a fear, even if it is justified,
ought to result in a blanket prohibition on the use of modern reproductive technology. Steinberg addresses this issue in an appendix to his entry on IVF and makes a number of salient points. 97 In
principle, there is no power in contemporary times to make the
entire Jewish people subject to new prohibitions aimed at protecting either biblical or rabbinic laws. This power ceased with the Talmud, 98 and any subsequent protective legislation is perforce, local
in its scope. There is also a general trend not to add local protective legislation to that already in place under Talmudic law, unless
it is considered vitally necessary by all the authorities in any particular place. 99 Steinberg sums up the various rules and regulations
regarding the halakhic approach to protective legislation in cases
where the fear of breaching the law is based upon considerations of
a practical nature, and concludes that there is no halakhic basis for
ruling against IVF on those grounds. 100 He also points out that
halakhic authorities in this area need to possess a high degree of
scientific and medical expertise in order to base their rulings upon
fact, and not upon surmise. The "strict is best" policy, therefore,
should be used sparingly, if at all, in areas where halakhic authorities are often not sufficiently skilled to make accurate judgments
with regard to empirical facts. 1 1
In conclusion, the debate between R. Waldenberg and R.
Nebenzahl focuses on the position that halakhah ought to adopt
vis-t-vis new, morally unsettling technology. R. Waldenberg strenuously argues for a stringent, non-permissive approach based
96. Id. at 126-27. Steinberg also refers, in this context, to the Talmudic statement
regarding the erasure of the Divine Name for the purpose of bringing about peace
between a man and his wife.
97. Id. at 150.
98. See ROSH, TALMUD BAVLI SHABBAT 2 no. 15; SEDEI HEMED, MAAREKHET
GIMMEL no. 11; see also STEINBERG, supra note 95, at 155 n.11.
99. See RESPONSA RIVASH no. 271; RESPONSA RASHBA 3 no. 411; RESPONSA
MAHARIL no. 121; see also THE PRINCIPLES OF JEWISH LAW, supra note 22, at 679-779
(discussing the general topic of communal enactments).
100. See MISHNAH YADAIM 4:3; TALMUD BAVLI BERAKHOT 60a; RASHI, TALMUD
BAVLI BEZAH 2b, sub voce deheterah; SEDEI HEMED, MAAREKHET KAF no. 19.
101. See STEINBERG, supra note 95, at 158-66.
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mainly upon a naturalistic approach to the way in which children
are brought into the world. R. Nebenzahl sees no principled
halakhic objection to the use of modern reproductive technology in
a reproductive context, when the sole motivation of all concerned
is to enable a married couple to have a child of their own, and to
avoid the possibility of the break-up of a marriage as a result of
infertility-related stress.102 In many respects, there is an interesting
parallel between this exchange and the one between R. Feinstein
and R. Teitelbaum over the issue of AID using non-Jewish sperm.
In both cases, the permissive position is based upon a formalist approach to halakhic decision-making, together with the rejection of
the view that any deviation from natural procreation is morally and
religiously wrong. The prohibitionist position relies upon a highly
eclectic approach to the sources and maintains that with one or two
exceptions, only natural procreation is morally and religiously
acceptable.
VI.

HALAKHIC

PROBLEMS IN RELATION TO IVF USING DONOR

EGGS OR A SURROGATE MOTHER: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
MATERNITY AND JEWISH IDENTITY

Many forms of female infertility are only treatable using donor
eggs or a surrogate mother, and both methods raise significant
halakhic problems in relation to the establishment of maternity and
Jewish identity.
The question of maternal identity-which is important for the
halakhic issues of incest, Jewish identity, and some aspects of civil
law-arises with regard to IVF in a case where the genetic mother
and the birth mother are two different people, such as a surrogate
mother.1"3 One widely accepted view amongst halakhic authorities
is that the birth mother alone is considered to be the halakhic
mother of the child. 104 The leading Talmudic precedent for this
view is the ruling that brothers, whose mother converted to Juda102. See S. Barris & J. Comet, Infertility: Issues From the Heart, in BE FRUITFUL
supra note 13, at 19-37 (discussing the high social motivation underlying the trend to seek infertility treatment amongst Orthodox Jews).
103. See STEINBERG, supra note 95, at 133; see also Nehemiah Zalman Goldberg,
Establishing Maternity in the Case of Fetal Implants, 5 TEHUMIN 249 (1984); Moshe
Hershler, Test Tube Babies According to the Halakhah, 1 HALAKHAH UREFAH 313-20
(1980); Avraham Kilav, Is Maternity Established by Conception or Birth?, 5 TEHUMIN
260-67; Moses Sternbuch, On Test Tube Babies, 8 BISHVILEI HAREFUAH 29-41 (1978);
cf. Yehoshua Ben-Meir, The Lineage of a Child Born to a Surrogate Mother and an
Egg Donor,41 AsslA 25-40 (1986); Ezra Bick, Ovum Donations:A Rabbinic Conceptual Model of Maternity, 28 TRADITION 28-45 (1993).
104. See Broyde, supra note 32, at 131-40.
AND MULTIPLY,
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ism during pregnancy, are not included in the law of levirate marriage and halitzah but are, nevertheless, forbidden to marry each
other's wives. 10 5 The reason for the non-applicability of the levirate law is that the brothers are not related on their father's side,
since non-Jewish paternity is not recognized under Jewish law, and
the levirate law only applies to brothers from the same father.
However, they are related on their mother's side, and are therefore, forbidden to each other's wives, because they emerged from
her womb after her conversion. In other words, since any biological relationship with their non-Jewish father lacks legal significance
under Jewish law, the obligation to perform halitzah to each other's
widows does not apply. However, the prohibition on having intercourse with a brother's wife' 016 does apply, because they are considered brothers on their mother's side.
The question then posed by the Talmud is that since conversion
to Judaism severs all pre-existing legal links between members of
the same biological family,' 0 7 why are the two brothers considered
related on their mother's side? Because they are all converts to
Judaism, they should be considered total strangers, both to each
other, and to their mother. Proof that conversion does indeed cut
all legal links between members of the same biological family is
found in the law that a convert is permitted to marry any converted
female relative, since all family members undergoing conversion
are considered as if they were born anew. 108 It should be pointed
out that under rabbinic law, such marriages between biological relatives are forbidden, since they offend against universally accepted
moral conventions. 0 9 The question posed by the Talmud is answered by maintaining that the fact that the brothers come out of a
Jewish womb, and not because they are genetically related to their
mother, is the reason that they are considered her children, and
therefore, bound by the law forbidding brothers from marrying
each other's wives. This point is made by Rashi who comments
that, as far as the issue of marrying sisters-in-law is concerned, the
link between the brothers is established by their birth since their
converted mother "is like any other Jewish woman who gives
birth." 110 Thus, maternity is established through birth,' and not
105. See TALMUD BAVLI YEVAMOT 97b; see also supra notes 14-15.
106. Leviticus 18:16.
107. See TALMUD BAVLI YEVAMOT 22a; MAIMONIDES, HILKHOT ISSUREI
14:12; SHULHAN ARUKH, YOREH DEAH 69:1.
108. SHULHAN ARUKH, YOREH DEAH 269:1.
109. TUR, YOREH DEAH 269.
110. See RASHI, TALMUD BAVLI YEVAMOT 97b, sub voce aval hayavin.
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genetics. Therefore, the rule in surrogacy situations is that it is the
woman who gives birth to the child who is the legal mother, and
not the egg donor.
There is a minority view that views the egg donor as the halakhic
mother. 12 The majority of halakhic authorities have not accepted
1 14
this view," 3 as it is based primarily on non-legal sources.
R. David Bleich makes an important contribution to the modern
debate on establishing maternity, arguing that in light of the doubtful state of the law in this area, a child born to a surrogate has two
mothers for legal purposes." 5 Citing a number of examples drawn
from the laws of agriculture, R. Bleich develops a general theory
that in a case where there is doubt about the status of a plant transplant, it is best resolved by adopting a stringent approach, and
treating the transplant, for the purpose of all relevant prohibitions,
as being an organic part of the plant onto which it has been transplanted. Similarly, the product of a surrogate mother is forbidden
to marry two sets of relatives; those of the egg donor and those of
the surrogate.
In fact, the analogy with agricultural laws is not new in this area
of the halakhah. R. Yekutiel Kamelhar discussed the legal implications of ovarian transplants in a halakhic journal published in Warsaw in 1932. Regarding the maternity of a child born to the
recipient of a transplanted ovary, R. Kamelhar held that maternity
was determined by the birth mother since the ovary became an
integral part of her body upon its implantation. His reasoning was
based, inter alia, upon the law of orlah, the prohibition upon eating
the fruit of a newly planted tree during the first three years after
planting.' 6 According to a plain reading of the Talmud, the fruit
of an orlah branch grafted on to a tree that is older than three
years may be eaten, since the transplant has become an integral
111. See TOSAFOT, TALMUD BAVLI KETUBOT 11a, sub voce matbilin oto.
112. Shlomo Goren, Embryo Transplantation According to the Halakhah, 17
HAZOFEH 12 (1984); 1. Warhaftig, An Addendum to the Test Tube Babies Debate, 5
TEHUMIN 268-69 (1984).
113. See BLEICH, supra note 91, at 238.
114. See TALMUD BAVLI SANHEDRIN 91b (discussing the time of ensoulment, which
is apparently at conception. Hence, maternity is also fixed at conception.); see also
TALMUD BAVLI NIDDAH 31a (stating that there are three partners in a person, i.e.,
father, mother, and God. Each partner makes his or her contribution at the time of
conception, hence, that is the moment at which maternity must be established.); Exodus 21:22 (describing a miscarriage as "the loss by a woman of her offspring." Therefore, maternity is relevant to the fetal stage and does not only arise at birth.). None of
these arguments are, however, legally definitive.
115. See BLEICH, supra note 91, at 237-72.
116. See 12 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA 1467-68 (1972).
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part of the tree on to which it was grafted." 7 R. Kamelhar applies
this principle directly to the case of an ovarian transplant, and decides in favor of the birth mother. 18
R. Bleich undertakes an extensive analysis of the sources dealing
with plant transplants,11 9 and reaches the conclusion that in all of
them, the final status of such a transplant remains halakhically unresolved. As a result, any legal ramifications of the transplant are
to be dealt with by applying the strictures relating both to the
transplant and to the transplantee. In other words, the transplant
should, "for safety's sake," be treated as if it were the product of
both the donor and the donee.1 20 Therefore, a child born to a surrogate mother using a donor egg is halakhically bound to refrain
from marrying into the families of both the egg donor and the birth
mother.
The notion of double maternity is not without its critics. R.
Auerbach objects to the very existence of any analogy between agricultural laws and the halakhah governing the assisted conception
of human beings.1 21 R. Nebenzahl raised a similar objection to this
1

point.

22

In addition to the question of the appropriateness of these
sources for resolving the issue of maternity in a human context,
there is also a basic difference between the issue of doubtful maternity generated by IVF, and that of the agricultural hybrids referred
to above. In most of the precedents taken from agriculture, there
is no solution in the Talmud with regard to the halakhic implica117. TALMUD BAVLI SOTAH 43b; TALMUD BAVLI MENAHOT 69b.
118. See YEKUTIEL GREENWALD, 1 KOL Bo AL AVELUT 306 (1973) (citing YEKU-

TIEL KAMELHAR, HATALMUD UMADEI HATEVEL 44-45). R. Kamelhar also makes
the point that it is the womb rather than the egg that nurtures the fetus and cites
another Talmudic rule, this time in the area of animal husbandry to indicate that nurturing plays an, important role in arriving at a definition of maternity. See TALMUD
BAVLI HULLIN 79a; see also J. DAVID BLEICH, CONTEMPORARY HALAKHIC
PROBLEMS 1, 106-09 (1977).
119. See Z. Low, Concerning the Children of Surrogate Mothers, 133 OR
HAMIZRACH 150-60 (1989) (analyzing maternity from the standpoint of laws concerning agriculture and animal husbandry, which provided the setting for R. Bleich's
argument).
120. Clearly, R. Bleich reads the Talmudic discussion in Talmud Bavli Menahot 69b
in a more complex manner than did R. Kamelhar, and he also analyzes other cases
ranging from the status of produce reaching growth prior to the offering of the Omer
sacrifice to the prohibition on planting mixed agricultural species in a vineyard. See 12
ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA, supra note 116, at 169-72, 1382-84.
121. See Low, supra note 119, at 158.
122. See id.; see also Kilav, supra note 103, at 267; supra text accompanying notes
93-102 (discussing R. Nebenzahl's views on IVF using the gametes of a married
couple).
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tions of the transplant, and the questions remain unresolved. This
is not the case with regard to the establishment of maternity. Here,
there is Talmudic support for the birth mother, and while it is the
only way of resolving the issue, there is not the same type of official uncertainty with regard to maternity, as there is in relation to
plant transplants. R. Bleich's view is, therefore, not entirely convincing. Also, Avraham Steinberg's above-mentioned remarks in
relation to the need to avoid resolving doubtful cases arising out of
new technologies on the basis of stringency alone, need to be taken
into account in any assessment of the dual maternity concept.
From a scientific perspective, however, the double maternity approach looks quite promising if the uncertainty amongst modern
authorities regarding maternity in surrogate situations is read as a
response to the challenge raised by modern genetics to the traditional approach. Clearly, modern genetics provides the basis for a
very strong argument in favor of the egg donor, as opposed to the
birth mother. It is also clear that traditional Jewish law does not
really have any clear concept of the role of the female ovum in
human reproduction,'23 and hence, it is quite unlikely that any definitive halakhic model exists for the establishment of maternity on
the basis of conception alone. Against this background, any support for a more genetically friendly approach on the part of Jewish
law, expressed in terms of recognition of the claim to maternity of
the egg donor, is welcome. This is the case even if R. Bleich's analogy with agricultural laws is not quite convincing. From this perspective, the double maternity approach leads us to the issue of the
role of science in the halakhah. For present purposes, it is sufficient to observe that in general, the relationship between scientific
theory and halakhic decision-making is a dynamic one, and there
are past examples of scientific concepts being taken on board by
halakhists,notwithstanding the perceived initial lack of fit between
these concepts and traditional halakhic precedents.124 This may
also be the case in relation to the adoption of at least a partly ge123. See STEINBERG, supra note 95, at 423 nn.209-14. Indeed, it would appear that
the majority view was that a woman's "seed" consisted of her menstrual blood.
124. See Dov Frimer, Jewish Law and Science in the Writings of R. Isaac Halevy
Herzog, 5 JEWISH L. Ass'N STUD. 33 (1991); Daniel B. Sinclair, Torah and Scientific
Methodology in Maimonides Halakhic Writings, 39 LE'ELA 30 (1995). In general, the
fit between traditional notions of parenthood and the reproductive options available
as a result of modern technology is coming into question and there is a very real
possibility that the concept of parenthood itself will need to be defined in an entirely
new way. See Y. Weiler, Surrogacy and Changes in the Concept of Parenthood,57-58
AssIA 141-72 (1966).
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netic criterion for establishing maternity, although only the future
will tell whether or not this will, indeed, come to pass.
The other major problem associated with egg donation and surrogacy is the establishment of Jewish identity. According to the
125
halakhah, birth to a Jewish mother determines Jewish identity.
It might have been assumed that since birth determines maternity,
as long as the surrogate is Jewish, the identity of the egg donor is
irrelevant. However, it is not so simple. Some modern authorities
insist that the product of a non-Jewish egg and a Jewish womb must
undergo immersion in a ritual bath-one of the main prerequisites
of conversion to Judaism-before he or she is qualified to enter
into the "sanctity of Israel." This immersion is, indeed, a form of
conversion applicable in cases where there is Jewish maternal lineage, but full affinity with the Jewish people has not yet been
achieved. 126 According to this view, both birth and conception
must take place in the body of a Jewish woman in order that her
child is considered fully Jewish. The source for this view is the Talmudic ruling 127 that a child born to a woman who converted during
her pregnancy is Jewish because her mother underwent the ceremony, and by virtue of being inside her womb, the fetus also became a convert to Judaism. 128 If the child is male, then the
circumcision which takes place after birth doubles as a conversion
circumcision, as well as the one required for every Jewish boy
under biblical law. In order to reconcile this view with the principle of birth being the determinant of identity, a distinction is made
between Jewish maternal lineage, and the act of conversion necessary for endowing an individual with the holiness of an Israelite. A
child conceived by a non-Jewish woman who converted during
pregnancy is born to a Jewish mother and hence, possesses Jewish
identity. However, conception by a non-Jewish mother constitutes
a flaw as far as the "holiness of Israel" is concerned, and the product of such a conception, even if she is born to a Jewish mother,
requires conversion. It follows from this position that if a fertilized
125. TALMUD BAVLi KIDDUSHIN 66b; SHULHAN ARUKH, EVEN HAEZER 4:19-20.
126. HIDDUSHEI HAGRANAT, NASHIM UNEZIKIN 11a, sub voce vehanireh bazeh; see
also BLEICH, supra note 118, at 258-62; Sternbuch, supra note 103, at 36.
127. TALMUD BAVLI YEVAMOT 78a.
128. This would, indeed, seem to be the essence of the ruling since the Talmud goes
on to establish that the mother's body does not constitute a barrier between the fetus
and the waters of the ritual bath in which the immersion is performed. The reason for
this is that being inside its mother is "part of its natural growth" and natural barriers
do not render the immersion invalid. See RASHBA, TALMUD BAVLI YEVAMOT 47b48a; NIMMUKEI YOSEF, TALMUD BAVLI YEVAMOT 16a; BETH YOSEF, YOREH DEAH
268; DAGUL MEREVAVEH, YOREH DEAH 268:6 (citing Nahmanides' opinion).
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non-Jewish egg is transplanted into a JeWish surrogate, the result1 29
ing child still requires conversion.
Not all commentators adopt this understanding of the Talmudic
ruling in question; some maintain that the child of a convert is fully
Jewish merely by virtue of being born to a Jewish mother. 130 R.
Shlomo Zalman Auerbach maintains that a child born from a nonJewish egg and a Jewish surrogate requires conversion. 131 However, R. Nehemiah Zalman Goldberg argues that a fertilized nonJewish egg implanted into a Jewish surrogate results in a Jewish
child without any act of conversion being required, provided that
the implantation took place in the very early stages of fetal development. The basis for this view is the Talmudic principle that a
fetus is a limb of its mother, at least in the early stages of pregnancy.1 32 R. Aaron Soloveitchik, who maintains that an embryo
implanted prior to the fortieth day of gestation gains the religious
and national identity of its mother by virtue of birth alone, adopts a
similar approach.1 33 Since implantation in current IVF procedures
takes place within three days of fertilization, it is clear that the surrogate mother will determine the Jewish identity of the child.
The different approaches to the case of the Jewish status of the
pregnant convert, also impact upon the halakhic outcome in a case
involving a Jewish egg donor and a non-Jewish surrogate. According to the view that conversion is required, it might conceivably be
argued that the child is Jewish on the grounds that it was "conceived in holiness." Once conceived in holiness, there is no going
back, even if a non-Jewish surrogate brings the pregnancy to
term. 3
CONCLUSION

Jewish law has a long history in the area of medical law, beginning some 3000 years ago with the Bible, and continuing into the
21st century in the form of rabbinic responsa on the latest advances
in medical research and technology. It contains a vast storehouse
of primary and secondary principles, and a strong case-oriented ap129. See BLEICH, supra note 118, at 258-62.
130. See BIUREI HAGRA, YOREH DEAH 268:5; see also Broyde, supra note 32, at
136-38.
131. See Low, supra note 119, at 170 (also citing R. Nebenzahl in support of his
view).

132.
133.
(citing
134.

See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
See R. Moshe Soloveitchik, Test-Tube Baby, 100 OR HAMIZRAH 127-28 (1981)
his father, R. Aaron Soloveitchik).
See Kilav, supra note 103, at 262; see also BLEICH, supra note 91, at 269-70.
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proach to the resolution of problems in this area. Its legalistic
framework allows for a greater measure of flexibility with regard to
emerging assisted reproductive techniques than the naturalist approach of some other religious systems. At the same time, a note
of caution is always present in halakhic discussions in this field, and
we would do well to heed it before plunging headlong into the
mass application of all that science has to offer as far as assisted
reproduction is concerned. Undoubtedly, one of the most important lessons to be learned from the halakhah is that reproduction,
however it is carried out, is a serious and sacred task requiring the
utmost responsibility and commitment. It constitutes the fulfillment of a religious commandment, whether biblical or rabbinic,
and as such, is not a matter of choice, but of obligation. This approach contrasts with the notion of "reproductive autonomy"
which features in much contemporary discussion, both legal and
ethical, in this area. Jewish law starts with the concept of "procreative obligation," and meets the needs of individuals within the interstices of the legal principles that make up the halakhah in this
area. There may be a valuable lesson for bioethics in general in
this approach.

